12 FAM 260
(Office of Origin: DS/DO/ICI)
12 FAM 261 GENERAL
12 FAM 261.1 Program Implementation
a. The Department’s counterintelligence (CI) program is defensive in nature. Its purpose is to deter, detect, and neutralize the threat posed by hostile intelligence services against U.S. diplomatic personnel, facilities, equipment, and information. This protection extends to the Department’s direct-hire employees as well as to contractors and dependents of U.S. Government personnel serving abroad under the authority of a chief of mission (COM).
b. The Office of Investigations and Counterintelligence (DS/DO/ICI) is responsible for the implementation of all CI programs, which the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) coordinates with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) and other members of the U.S. Intelligence Community. DS/DO/ICI conducts CI investigations (see 1 FAM 262.4-1) and implements the programs described in this subchapter.
12 FAM 261.2 Authority
a. The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Public Law 99-399, Section 103, authorizes the Secretary of State to develop and implement policies and programs that provide for the security of U.S. Government operations of a diplomatic nature, and foreign government operations of a diplomatic nature in the United States. This mission includes consultation with Federal agencies having personnel under COM authority.
b. The Secretary of State is authorized to develop and implement a special personnel security program for the Department’s employees who are responsible for security at diplomatic and consular posts in high-intelligence threat countries in accordance with Public Law 100-204, Section 155(a).
c. E.O. 10450 requires the investigation of civilian officers and employees to ensure their initial and continued employment is clearly consistent with national security.
d. 5 U.S.C. 301 authorizes heads of agencies to prescribe regulations regarding the conduct of employees.
e. 22 U.S.C. 2651a gives the Secretary of State authority to prescribe regulations relating to duties, functions, and obligations of the Department’s employees (see 3 FAM, Personnel).
f. E.O. 12968 establishes a uniform Federal personnel security program for employees who will be considered for initial or continued access to classified information
12 FAM 261.3 Counterintelligence Working Groups
a. Counterintelligence working groups (CIWGs) review post-specific CI issues on a periodic basis and are chaired by the deputy chief of mission (DCM). The Diplomatic Security Counterintelligence Division (DS/ICI/CI) provides guidance and advice, as necessary, to post CIWGs that perform the following functions:
(1) Evaluate human intelligence (HUMINT) and technical threats posed by host government and/or foreign intelligence services;
(2) Determine the level of vulnerability of existing personnel and facilities;
(3) Take appropriate actions to counter an identified threat;
(4) Monitor the effectiveness of existing CI plans, programs, and practices; and
(5) Coordinate all post CI programs.
b. See 12 FAH-6, Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) Security Standards and Policy Handbook, for CIWG reporting requirements and meeting frequencies. A report of issues addressed at each meeting is submitted to DS/ICI/CI
12 FAM 261.4 Counterintelligence Surveys
a. DS/ICI/CI performs CI surveys at posts identified in the Department’s Security Environment Threat List (SETL) as having a critical or high HUMINT threat (the SETL is available on the classified network via links on the Department’s Web site). Although surveys are intended for only critical and high HUMINT threat posts, any regional security officer (RSO) may request that DS/ICI/CI perform a CI survey based on a changing threat environment.
b. CI surveys provide:
(1) An analysis of the HUMINT threat at the post;
(2) An evaluation of the effectiveness of existing post countermeasures; and
(3) Recommendations for improving those countermeasures.
12 FAM 262 SECURITY AWARENESS AND CONTACT REPORTING
12 FAM 262.1 Policy
a. The Department’s regulations have long required employees to report contacts with nationals of certain countries, due to both intelligence and terrorism concerns. Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-12 issued specific instructions and mandated that all U.S. Government agencies implement similar programs. The procedures listed in 12 FAM 262.1, paragraph b meet the President’s requirement that those who serve in America’s most sensitive jobs work with security offices to guard against illegal or unauthorized access to classified or otherwise sensitive information.
b. All employees and contractors must report:
(1) Unofficial contact with a national from a country with critical HUMINT threat posts listed on the Department’s SETL if the employee and/or critical threat foreign national suggest, agree to, or actually have a second meeting after an initial encounter;
(2) Contact and/or association with a person or organization whom the employee knows or suspects advocate the unlawful overthrow of the U.S. Government;
(3) Contact and/or association with a person whom the employee knows or suspects is a member or supporter of foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs), as designated by the Secretary of State (This list is available on the Foreign Terrorist Organizations page.
(4) Unofficial contact with a person whom the employee knows or suspects is a member of a foreign intelligence agency, regardless of nationality;
(5) Illegal or unauthorized access that is sought to classified or otherwise sensitive information; or
(6) The employee’s concern that he or she may be the target of actual or attempted exploitation by a foreign entity.
c. This policy is not intended to limit or impair professional or personal contacts. Its purpose is to protect the security of the United States and its employees while ensuring the privacy of employees and their freedom of association. Further, this policy seeks to ensure that security risks to persons or to the U.S. Government are identified at the earliest possible opportunity and deterred, and that protective steps are taken to avoid compromise of U.S. employees and national security interests. Employees are considered partners in the management of this regulation.
d. The term “contact” means all manner of personal or impersonal communication and includes, but is not limited to, written, telephonic, electronic mail, text messaging, chat room discussion or other social media, facsimile, wire, and/or amateur radio.
12 FAM 262.1-1 Application
These regulations apply abroad to all U.S. citizen employees of the U.S. Government, civilian or military, whether permanently assigned or sent abroad on a temporary duty (TDY) basis, who are under COM authority, as well as Department employees on the staffs of international organizations. In addition, these regulations apply abroad to contractors of the U.S. Government. Domestically, these regulations apply to all employees and contractors of the Department. These regulations do not apply domestically to employees or contractors of U.S. Government agencies other than the Department.
12 FAM 262.1-2 Legal Authorities
a. Title I of Public Law 99-399, the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, as amended, codified at 22 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.
b. Presidential Decision Directive of August 5, 1993, entitled, “Security Awareness and Reporting of Foreign Contacts” (PDD/NSC-12).
12 FAM 262.1-3 Implementation
The Office of Investigations and Counterintelligence (DS/ICI/CI) is responsible for administering this program domestically for the Department and abroad through RSOs.
12 FAM 262.2 Security Awareness and Counseling
a. The regional security officer (RSO) or the post security officer (PSO) must give an arrival briefing to all employees and contractors assigned to the post on a permanent change of station. The briefing must include information on CI issues of concern at the post and contact reporting responsibilities, to include a listing of all current critical HUMINT threat posts and information on where to find the SETL on the Department’s classified network. The RSO or PSO must brief TDY personnel on contact reporting responsibilities and other CI issues, as appropriate, but in every case if the TDY is over 25 days. The RSO or PSO is also available to provide an unclassified brief to adult dependents of employees and contractors on a voluntary basis. (See 12 FAM 263—Counterintelligence Awareness Program.) Domestically, the bureau security officer (BSO) must brief Bureau employees on CI issues.
b. When an employee reports a contact, the RSO abroad and DS/ICI/CI domestically must conduct checks to determine if information is available, indicating that the foreign national has a background connected with intelligence gathering. The RSO or DS/ICI/CI may, as appropriate, discuss the results of the checks with the employee.
c. The success of this policy is dependent upon the security awareness of each employee and upon each employee’s understanding of and cooperation with its intent. The RSO, PSO, or DS/ICI/CI should alert employees to any suspicious activity or approach by individuals of any nationality. At the post, if an employee is unsure about the circumstances of a contact, the employee must discuss the situation with the RSO or PSO, to determine whether filing a report is necessary. In the United States, employees must consult with DS/ICI/CI.
12 FAM 262.3 Responsibilities and Procedures
12 FAM 262.3-1 RSO and PSO
a. The RSO or PSO must brief all mission employees, TDY employees, and contractors about the contact reporting policy and obtain their signatures on an Acknowledgement of Policy Format (see 12 FAM Exhibit 262.3-1).
b. When Foreign Contact Report forms are filed by employees at the post, RSOs or PSOs must review and evaluate the reported information and discuss the contact with the employee, providing counseling, as appropriate. The contact reports are automatically forwarded to DS/ICI/CI for additional vetting and processing. The RSO or PSO must promptly report any facts or circumstances of a reported contact with individuals of any nationality to DS/ICI/CI and the employee’s parent agency if they appear to:
(1) Indicate an attempt, intention, or reasonable potential to obtain unauthorized access to classified, sensitive, or proprietary information or technology; or
(2) Indicate the possibility that the employee is being targeted for development by a foreign entity or agent of a foreign entity.
12 FAM 262.3-2 Employee Responsibility
a. Employees and contractors must familiarize themselves with posts listed as critical for HUMINT threat on the SETL at least annually.
b. Employees and contractors must immediately report any contacts with individuals of any nationality under circumstances referred to in 12 FAM 262.1, paragraph b. In general, employee reporting should occur within one business day after such contact has occurred. If unable to report within this time frame, or unsure about the need to report at all, employees at post should notify the RSO or PSO as soon as practicable. If the RSO/PSO is unavailable, notify the DCM. Domestically, employees must promptly notify either DS/ICI/CI or the security office of their parent agency, as appropriate.
c. Employees to whom these regulations apply must use Form DS-1887, Foreign Contact Report (available on E-Forms), to report all contacts for which reports are required under 12 FAM 262.1, paragraph b. If the official duty station is a U.S. mission abroad, the report must be submitted to either the RSO or PSO. If the official duty station is in the United States, employees and contractors of the Department must send the Foreign Contact Report to DS/ICI/CI. Form DS-1887 is encrypted when transmitted and is secure as any online banking transaction an employee may conduct via the Internet. The form will be sent to a DS Special Agent in DS/ICI/CI responsible for the employee’s region. A paper copy of Form DS-1887 may be submitted when there is no access to the Department OpenNet.
d. Failure to comply with 12 FAM 262.1, paragraph b, Policy, for any reason may initiate a DS review of the circumstances leading to the non-compliance. DS will determine whether, considering all facts available upon receipt of the initial information, it is in the interests of the national security to suspend the employee’s access to classified information on an interim basis until sufficient information is available to determine whether access to classified information will be reinstated or the employee’s clearance will be revoked. DS may also refer such cases to the Bureau of Human Resource’s Office of Employee Relations (HR/ER) for the appropriate administrative action, as required.
12 FAM 262.3-3 Post Discretion
Posts may establish additional procedures to suit their particular security situations. Before adopting any additional procedures, the post CIWG should discuss them and then DS, in coordination with the security offices of parent agencies represented at the post, must approve them. All post requirements must be consistent with PDD/NSC-12 and meet the minimum requirements of 12 FAM 262.1, Policy.
12 FAM 262.3-4 Other Agency Discretion
Other than the Department, agencies that are under COM authority may also require their employees under special access programs to follow additional reporting requirements, to the extent that such policies and requirements are consistent with PDD/NSC-12 and 12 FAM 262.1, Policy.
12 FAM 262.3-5 Contact Reports Originating at Post
The RSO or PSO must expedite employee contact reports, when not submitted electronically via the myData homepage, to DS/ICI/CI or through DS/ICI/CI to the employee’s parent agency. DS/ICI/CI must also refer such information to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), following procedures agreed to between DS and the CIA.
12 FAM 262.3-6 Contact Reports Originating Domestically
DS/ICI/CI must refer contact reports received domestically from employees or contractors of the Department to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), following procedures agreed to between DS and the FBI.
12 FAM 262.4 Accountability
Upon receiving a contact report and if DS/ICI/CI perceives actual or potential security problems relating to an individual of any nationality, DS/ICI/CI or the RSO must advise the employee to take appropriate precautions. A signed acknowledgement of the individual’s understanding of these precautions should be obtained and a copy recorded in the Diplomatic Security Counterintelligence Division (DS/ICI/CI). As noted in 12 FAM 262.3-2, paragraph c, Employee Responsibility, disciplinary action and/or suspension of a security clearance may result from an employee’s failure to report a contact under the circumstances described in 12 FAM 262.1, Policy.
12 FAM 263 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AWARENESS PROGRAM
12 FAM 263.1 Policy
a. The RSO or PSO must brief all employees and contractors assigned to the post on permanent change of station. The briefing must include the information on CI. The RSO or PSO should make unclassified briefings available to adult dependents of employees and to contractors on a voluntary basis.
b. This policy applies to all executive branch agencies under COM authority.
c. For the purpose of this section, the term “contractor” is defined as a U.S. personal services contractor serving under COM authority or an employee of a commercial firm having a contract with the U.S. Government and serving under COM authority.
12 FAM 263.2 CI Awareness Training
DS/ICI/CI conducts CI and security awareness training programs, in coordination with the DS Training Center and other agencies, for the following employees and their dependents:
(1) Ambassadors and DCMs;
(2) Foreign Service officers;
(3) Contractors and other Department personnel assigned to critical and high threat CI posts;
(5) Diplomatic Security CI special agents;
(6) Marine security guards;
(7) Navy Seabees;
(8) Diplomatic couriers;
(9) U.S. military attachés; and
(10) Other U.S. Government agency personnel, as required.
12 FAM 263.3 Post Procedures
Post threat levels are defined and identified on the SETL (classified), which is published by DS.
12 FAM 263.3-1 Low, Medium, and High Counterintelligence-Threat Posts
a. RSOs or PSOs must provide CI briefings to locally employed U.S. citizens under COM authority and ensure that Foreign Service nationals (FSNs) and third-country nationals (TCNs) are briefed in accordance with the FSN briefing program.
b. At high-threat posts, RSOs or PSOs should provide CI briefings to TDY personnel and other official visitors. At low- and medium-threat posts, RSOs or PSOs should distribute an unclassified written notice to TDY personnel and other visitors giving them guidance on the local intelligence threat.
c. RSOs or PSOs must conduct departure security debriefings for all employees and contractors completing a tour of duty at a post. The debriefing must include a discussion of CI matters. Should the RSO or PSO obtain information of a CI concern, he or she must forward a copy of the debriefing to DS/ICI/CI, which must forward a copy to the parent agency.
12 FAM 263.3-2 Critical Human Intelligence-Threat Posts
a. In addition to the security awareness requirements cited in 12 FAM 262, all executive branch agencies sending employees to critical HUMINT threat posts must review the proposed permanent assignment of all of their employees, contractors, and TDY personnel assigned in excess of 60 days accumulated in 1 year (not necessarily consecutive) to determine their suitability;
b. DS/ICI/CI reviews background investigations and personnel files on all Department employees proposed for permanent assignment to HUMINT-threat posts. DS/ICI/CI evaluates security and suitability factors that could adversely affect suitability for assignment, in light of the heightened HUMINT threat, and any personal vulnerability potentially subject to HUMINT exploitation. DS/ICI/CI prepares a recommendation to the Director General of the Foreign Service (DGHR) with respect to an employee’s suitability for assignment to a HUMINT threat post after considering the following circumstances:
(1) Whether the employee or an immediate family member has an immediate family member still residing in the proposed critical HUMINT threat country;
(2) Whether the employee or an immediate family member has other family ties in any critical HUMINT threat post where a foreign intelligence service (FIS) could exploit familial bonds of affection;
(3) Whether the employee has family member(s) currently or recently employed by the critical HUMINT threat country’s military armed forces, intelligence or security service, police service, or ministry of foreign affairs;
(5) Whether the employee is or has been a known target of interest to a FIS;
(6) Whether the employee has a history of aberrant behavior such as drug or alcohol abuse or criminal misconduct;
(7) Whether the employee has demonstrated emotional instability (as determined by the Office of Medical Services (MED));
(8) Whether the employee has exhibited financial or fiscal management irresponsibility that interferes with his or her performance of duty;
(9) Whether a past investigation concerning the employee documents a serious allegation concerning misconduct, suitability, or professional ethics that could be exploited by a FIS;
(10) Whether the employee has had more than one previous assignment to the same critical HUMINT threat post;
(11) Whether the employee has made an unauthorized disclosure of sensitive or classified information;
(12) Whether the employee or close family member has demonstrated loyalty to the proposed critical HUMINT threat country of assignment (i.e., previously employed with the FIS or ministry of foreign affairs); and
(13) Whether the employee has had romantic involvement with citizen(s) of the proposed critical HUMINT threat country of assignment.
c. The DGHR may accept or reject the recommendation made by DS for the proposed assignment to a critical HUMINT threat post. Upon request, DS must provide any pertinent information regarding the recommendation to the DGHR;
d. The Office of Personnel Security and Suitability (DS/SI/PSS) reviews the background investigations of all contractors and employees of contractors proposed for assignment to critical HUMINT threat posts. DS uses the provisions of 12 FAM 263.3-2, paragraph b, Critical Human Intelligence Threat Posts, 12 FAM 570, Industrial Security Program, and 12 FAM 230, Personnel Security, as a basis for adjudicating final determinations on suitability. When there are CI concerns, DS/SI/PSS forwards the investigation to DS/ICI/CI. DS/ICI/CI reviews the investigation and offers a recommendation to DS/SI/PSS. DS/SI/PSS makes the final determination and forwards it to the Industrial Security Division (DS/ISP/IND) to provide to the bureau requesting the contractor’s assignment to a critical HUMINT threat post;
e. The RSO or PSO must provide CI briefings to locally employed U.S. citizens under COM authority and ensure that FSNs and TCNs are briefed in accordance with the FSN briefing program;
f. The RSO or PSO must conduct a CI awareness refresher briefing with all employees annually. The RSO or PSO should make these refresher briefings available to adult dependents on a voluntary basis;
g. The RSO or PSO must conduct a routine departure security debriefing for all employees and contractors completing a tour of duty at a post prior to the employee’s or contractor’s departure. The debriefing must include a discussion of CI matters. Should the RSO or PSO obtain information of a CI concern, he or she must forward a copy of the debriefing to DS/ICI/CI, which must forward a copy to the parent agency; and
h. The RSO must notify DS/ICI/CI and the RSO at a gaining post of personnel transfers and then, schedule debriefings. All employees completing a tour of duty must receive a special in-depth CI debriefing conducted by DS/ICI/CI or, in the case of direct transfers, by the RSO or PSO of the gaining post. All contract personnel must receive a special CI debriefing by either DS/ICI/CI or the contractor. All TDY employees must receive a special CI debriefing upon completion of the TDY conducted by DS/ICI/CI or, in the case of TDY from one post to another, by the RSO or PSO of the post of their residence. Employees or contract personnel of agencies other than those of the Department who are returning to Washington, DC, must receive debriefing from the security office of their parent agency; when transferring between posts, the RSO or PSO at the gaining post must debrief other agency personnel to report security concerns or information of interest to their agency or to future travelers. The RSO or PSO should send copies of all special debriefings to the Diplomatic Security Counterintelligence Division (DS/ICI/CI), which will forward a copy to parent agencies. PSOs must also send a copy to the RSO. The RSO must notify DS/ICI/CI and the RSO at a gaining post of personnel transfers so that debriefings can be scheduled.
12 FAM 263.4 Domestic Programs
a. State only: DS/ICI/CI provides individual and post-specific domestic CI training on a formal and ad hoc basis and arranges for or provides post-specific briefings for individuals on a need-to-know basis.
b. In cooperation with DS/ICI/CI, the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) sponsors programs for employees assigned to selected critical threat posts. New Department employees attending FSI orientation also receive a segment on CI awareness.
c. DS/ICI/CI tailors specific programs for specialty professions such as cleared U.S. citizen guards, communicators, Seabees, etc.
d. DS/ICI/CI also provides CI briefings and policy support to other U.S. Government agencies.
12 FAM 264 PERSONAL TRAVEL TO CRITICAL HUMAN INTELLIGENCE THREAT COUNTRIES
12 FAM 264.1 Scope and Applicability
12 FAM 264.1-1 Scope
a. These requirements apply to Department employees and contractors, domestically and those of agencies under chief of mission (COM) authority. The Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) also cleared these requirements.
b. The requirements govern personal travel to countries with a critical HUMINT threat level and certain countries where the United States does not have diplomatic relations, which are both listed in the SETL.
12 FAM 264.1-2 Program Responsibility
DS/ICI/CI directly administers this program for the Department’s employees stationed domestically and indirectly through the RSO or PSO at posts.
12 FAM 264.2 Travel to Critical HUMINT THREAT POSTS
a. The criteria in the paragraphs in this section apply to travel to countries in which critical HUMINT threat posts are located, regardless of the threat level where the employee departs from or is stationed.
b. All employees and contractors of the U.S. Government under COM authority must notify the RSO or PSO at the post of their residence and schedule a CI defensive security briefing at least 2 weeks before starting personal travel to any country with a critical HUMINT threat level, including travel with tour groups. Employees and contractors of the Department stationed domestically must directly notify DS/ICI/CI.
c. Each employee intending to travel must provide a notification of personal travel using the format in 12 FAM Exhibit 264.2. The RSO, PSO, or DS/ICI/CI must retain this information as part of the permanent record.
d. The RSO, PSO, or DS/ICI/CI must provide pertinent information from the travel notification to U.S. embassies in the countries listed on the itinerary at least 1 week prior to the traveler’s intended departure. (Use the format in 12 FAM Exhibit 264.2.) RSOs or PSOs must also provide copies of their communications to DS/ICI/CI and to the security office of the traveler’s parent agency.
e. The RSO, PSO, or DS/ICI/CI, as appropriate, must provide each traveler with a CI defensive security briefing prior to their travel.
f. If detained or subjected to significant harassment or provocation while traveling, the travelers must immediately contact the nearest U.S. consul, attaché, RSO, or duty officer. Upon return to the post of their residence or Washington, DC, the traveler must report any unusual incidents, including those of potential security concerns, to the RSO, PSO, or DS/ICI/CI, as appropriate. RSOs and PSOs must in turn report unusual incidents, detention, harassment, provocation, etc. to DS/ICI/CI, which must forward copies of the reports to the traveler’s parent agency.
g. Employees of the Department granted access to sensitive compartmented information (SCI) have no additional travel obligation.
h. The Department encourages spouses, domestic partners as defined in 3 FAM 1610, and adult dependents of employees to advise the RSO, PSO, or DS/ICI/CI, as appropriate, of their personal travel, and receive any available unclassified defensive security briefings, especially those at their post of residence.
12 FAM 265 THROUGH 269 UNASSIGNED
12 FAM Exhibit 262.3-1
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF POLICY GOVERNING OFFICIAL AND PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH CERTAIN FOREIGN NATIONALS AND CONTACT REPORTING RESPONSIBILITIES (FORMAT)
This is to acknowledge that:
I have been briefed on this policy and understand my responsibilities to report contacts and associations with individuals listed in 12 FAM 262.1, paragraph b;
I understand that this policy applies abroad to all U.S. citizen employees of the U.S. Government, civilian or military, including contract employees, whether permanently assigned or TDY, who are under the authority of a chief of mission. Domestically, this policy applies to employees and contractors of the Department of State;
I understand that my failure to comply with this policy provides grounds for appropriate disciplinary action and/or suspension of my security clearance;
I understand that I should caution my adult dependents about the potential threat from foreign intelligence services and encourage them to report any attempts by foreign nationals to exploit them;
I understand that if I have any questions regarding this policy, I should raise them with the regional security officer or post security officer while abroad and the Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security Counterintelligence Division (DS/ICI/CI) when in the United States.
Signature Signature Date
Employee Name (typed or printed) Witnessing Official’s Name and Title
12 FAM Exhibit 264.2
NOTIFICATION OF PERSONAL TRAVEL TO CRITICAL HUMAN INTELLIGENCE THREAT POST/COUNTRY (FORMAT)
· This Information Is To Be Sent Via Classified Means Only.
· Do NOT Send This Information Via OpenNet/Intranet or Unclassified Transmission.
· Transmission Via Unclassified Means May Be Considered a Mishandling of Classified Information, per 12 FAM 550, Security Incident Program.
· Contact the Regional Security Office for assistance.
(When Completed: Use only on the appropriate classified system(s))
TO: (RSO; PSO; DS/ICI/CI)
FROM: (Name/Agency) (Post/Section)
TAGS/TERMS: ASEC (and others as appropriate, such as country TAGS)
SUBJECT: Personal Travel to Critical Human
Intelligence Threat Post
In accordance with 12 FAM 264.2, Procedures, you are hereby advised of the intended travel to a country with a critical human intelligence threat post. Missions in countries to be visited will respond to this notification only if there is objection to the trip or any aspect thereof.
1. Name of Traveler:
2. Date/Location of Birth:
3. Passport Number and Type:
4. Employing Department or Agency:
5. Title/Functional Position:
6. Names of accompanying dependents (date(s)/place(s)
7. Purpose, itinerary, dates, and means of travel:
8. Address in each country on itinerary:
9. Tour, group, or traveling companions:
10. If traveler or companion has relatives or friends
in countries on
itinerary, give name, relationship, address, and phone number (if known) and indicate whether contact is to be made:
11. If, under the laws of the country(ies) to be visited, the traveler has been or might still be a citizen of that country, please give details:
You may also give additional details as appropriate.
Derived from: 20XX STATE XXXXX, Subject: Security Environment Threat List, dated xxxxx
Source Marked: xx/xx/xxxx