Overseas Radio Networks
(CT:TEL-107; 01-28-2025)
(Office of Origin: DT/EI/NT/GTC)
5 FAH-2 H-731 VHF/UHF/HF Radio networks
(CT:TEL-107; 01-28-2025)
(Uniform all agencies)
Missions use very high frequency (VHF) or ultrahigh frequency (UHF) radio networks for communications between mission facilities, residences of mission personnel, official vehicles, and, in the case of high frequency (HF) radios, other posts.
5 FAH-2 H-732 other types of post radio networks
(CT:TEL-107; 01-28-2025)
(Uniform all agencies)
5 FAH-2 H-732.1 Emergency Action Committee (EAC) Networks
(CT:TEL-107; 01-28-2025)
(Uniform all agencies)
a. Emergency Action Committee (EAC) VHF or UHF radio networks are designed to fulfill the needs of a post’s Emergency Action Committee (EAC).
b. The network consists of one or more radio repeaters and encryption -capable base stations, mobile radios in selected official vehicles, and handheld radios. Base station remotes are located in the Post Communications Center (PCC) and Post One. Base stations are located in the Radio Network Equipment Room (RNER) or residences which are specified in a post’s EAP (See 12 FAH-1 Appendix 7 ).
5 FAH-2 H-732.2 Emergency and Evacuation (E&E) Networks
(CT:TEL 107; 01-28-2025)
(Uniform all agencies)
a. Emergency and Evacuation (E&E) VHF or UHF, and HF radio networks, are designed to fulfill the needs of a post’s Emergency and Evacuation plan within the Emergency Actions Plan for each overseas mission.
b. The network consists of one or more radio repeaters and digital base stations, mobile radios in selected official vehicles, and handheld radios. Base station remotes are located in the Post Communications Center (PCC) and Post One. Base stations are located in the Radio Network Equipment Room (RNER) or residences which are specified in a post’s EAP (see 12 FAH-1 Appendix 7).
5 FAH-2 H-732.3 Management Network (MGT)
(CT:TEL-107; 01-28-2025)
(Uniform all agencies)
a. Administrative (ADM) VHF or UHF networks are designed to provide communications to facilitate daily operations such as facility maintenance, General Services Office (GSO), and motor pool.
b. The network typically consists of base stations, mobile radios in official vehicles, hand-held radios, and possibly, one or more radio repeaters. Base stations are at central locations, such as the motor pool, GSO warehouse, GSO maintenance, and the Management section. A base station or other radio unit is often located with the telephone operator for emergencies and monitoring.
5 FAH-2 H-732.4 Local Guard Force (LGF) Networks
(CT:TEL-107; 01-28-2025)
a. Local Guard Force (LGF) VHF or UHF networks are designed to provide communications between guard posts and mobile patrol vehicles.
b. The network may consist of a repeater and base stations, mobile radios in selected official vehicles, and hand-held radios. Base stations may be located at guard posts and specified residences and facilities offices, which are designated by the regional security officer (RSO). Radios should be non-encrypted unless RSO and Diplomatic Technology chief at post grant a waiver.
5 FAH-2 H-732.5 Ambassador Protection Detail (APD) Networks
(CT:TEL-107; 01-28-2025)
a. Ambassador Protection Detail (APD) VHF or UHF networks are designed to provide communication for movements and protection of the ambassador or chargé d'affaires.
b. The network may consist of a repeater and encryption capable mobile radios in selected official vehicles, and hand-held radios.
5 FAH-2 H-732.6 Marine Security Guard (MSG) Networks
(CT:TEL-107; 01-28-2025)
a. Marine Security Guard (MSG) VHF or UHF networks are designed to provide communications among the MSGs as they perform their security patrols and quick reaction defensive maneuvers.
b. The network consists of a repeater and encryption capable digital base stations, mobile radios in selected official vehicles, and hand-held radios. The base station is typically located in the MSG residence (MSGR).
5 FAH-2 H-732.7 Worldwide Protective Services (WPS) Networks
(CT:TEL-107; 01-28-2025)
At certain high-threat posts, DS deploys protective details for Chief of Mission (COM) personnel under its WPS contract. Approved or cleared subscriber equipment may be contractor furnished equipment (CFE), and repeaters and associated networks may be government furnished approved equipment (GFE). Refer to 14 FAM 220 for General Acquisitions guidelines.
5 FAH-2 H-733 Operational Testing
(CT:TEL-107; 01-28-2025)
(Uniform all agencies)
a. E&E/EAC radio systems must be tested monthly, or more frequently, as directed by the COM to ensure the operational readiness of equipment and the proficiency of system users. Anyone who might use the networks in an emergency, including spouses and children, should participate in these tests. The Diplomatic Technology Chief (DT Chief) or DTO sub-unit Chief for Infrastructure (DT/I Chief), in coordination with the post’s Executive office, shall establish firm commitments from all users to ensure active participation in the testing upon issuance of the hand-held radio.
b. Post’s EAC must establish procedures for the monthly radio tests on the EAC and E&E networks. The test results must be made available to the Management Officer (MO), Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM), RSO, and Diplomatic Technology (DT) staff at post. If needed, the Regional Diplomatic Technology (RDT) Center may be included.
5 FAH-2 H-734 Radio User Training
(CT:TEL-107; 01-28-2025)
(Uniform all agencies)
Diplomatic Technology (DT) personnel at post will provide familiarization training to all participants on how to use the E&E, EAC, and ADM radio equipment assigned to them. The LGF, APD, MSG, and WPS familiarization training for hand-held radios, base stations, and mobile patrol radios is the responsibility of the RSO/PSO. DT personnel may also assist the RSO/PSO with guidance and training on these types of equipment.
5 FAH-2 H-735 Radio Encryption
(CT:TEL-107; 01-28-2025)
(State)
DT’s Radio Programs Branch (DT/EI/NT/GTC) provides Advance Encryption Standard (AES) radios for EAC radio networks. These encryption algorithms provide limited protection from unauthorized interception of voice communications. AES is approved for transmissions up to and including Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU). Under no circumstances should AES-equipped radios be used for the transmission of classified information, as defined by Executive Order 13526.
5 FAH-2 H-735.1 Controlling and Safeguarding Radios
(CT:TEL-107; 01-28-2025)
(State)
a. The classification of AES radio equipment, whether loaded with active AES key codes or not, is Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU). Locally Employed Staff (LE Staff), or Third-Country Nationals (TCNs) must not be permanently issued portable (hand-held) radios equipped with AES encryption. LE Staff TCNs may be granted limited use of AES-equipped radios, if approved in writing by the mission's DT Chief and/or DT/I Chief. However, foreign national access and use of AES radios must be limited to an immediate operational requirement. When foreign nationals are granted access to AES radio equipment, all cleared AES radio users must be notified that foreign nationals have been granted access to the encrypted system.
b. The installation of the AES radios must be limited to vehicles assigned to the COM, MSG, RSO, and those vehicles specifically identified in the mission’s EAP for evacuation use (See 12 FAH-1 Appendix 7).
c. Spare encryption capable radios must be zeroized and stored in a DS approved container or within the Limited Access Areas (LAA), only accessible by authorized personnel. See 12 FAH-6 H-634.4-3(C) paragraph c. for additional storage guidance. To ensure the integrity of encrypted conversations, all personnel issued an encryption capable radio must always maintain proper accountability. In the event a radio cannot be accounted for, the DT Chief and/or DT/I Chief must initiate an encryption key change and notify the RSO.
5 FAH-2 H-735.2 Maintenance
(CT:TEL-107; 01-28-2025)
(State)
a. Maintenance of AES-equipped radios must only be performed by Regional diplomatic technology officer (RDTO), Diplomatic technology officer (DTO), or cleared American contractor personnel that specialize in radio communications.
b. Foreign nationals may install and remove (vehicle) and fixed AES encryption capable radio equipment. These radios must be zeroized prior to foreign nationals' installation or removal.
c. When maintenance requirements of AES encryption capable radio equipment exceeds the capabilities of post's DTOs, equipment must be shipped via classified pouch to the Regional Diplomatic Technology (RDT) Center or DT's Radio Program Branch (DT/EI/NT/GTC) for servicing.
d. All AES radio equipment in storage or maintenance must be zeroized of all key codes.
5 FAH-2 H-735.3 Key Loaders
(CT:TEL-107; 01-28-2025)
(State)
a. All Diplomatic Technology (DT) maintained AES encryption key loaders (KVL) must be controlled by the DT Chief and/or DT/I Chief and stored either in LAA within a DS-approved container or CAA, only accessible by authorized personnel. All other AES encryption key loaders overseas must be stored in the same secure manner by their agency and/or office, limiting access only to authorized personnel. AES key loading equipment and key codes for radio systems operating at the SBU level fall under NIST regulations (NIST SP 800-53, SP 800-57, FIPS-197) and are not COMSEC accountable items.
5 FAH-2 H-735.4 Compromise and Loss of AES Equipment
(CT:TEL-107; 01-28-2025)
(State)
The integrity of AES encryption keys and equipment is critical to ensuring that radio communication is protected. Any AES equipped radio, keying equipment, or key codes that are lost, stolen, seized, captured, or otherwise compromised, must be reported immediately to post DT staff and RSO.
5 FAH-2 H-735.5 Emergency Destruction
(CT:TEL-107; 01-28-2025)
(State)
a. The mission's DT Chief and/or DT/I Chief, and RSO must determine the appropriate course of action, based on local conditions, to protect the integrity of the Department's AES equipment. For situations that require the abandonment of AES radio assets, actions should be taken to ensure that the AES equipment is destroyed. In a nonemergency situation, the equipment must be sent via classified pouch to the mission’s designated safe haven for secure storage. AES equipment should be included in the “list of holdings section” on the “facility specific information” as part of the “destruction of sensitive materials” response plan in the EAP (See 12 FAH-1 Annex E 4.2).
b. In the event the mission should execute its COMSEC Emergency Destruction Plan (see 5 FAH-6 on ClassNet), all AES radio equipment must be collected, zeroized, and secured in the mission's PCC after its use is no longer practical. AES-equipped radios that must be abandoned with vehicles must be destroyed using an appropriate destruction device (e.g., a sledgehammer) if removal of the equipment is not possible. AES equipment must never be abandoned, keyed and in working condition, if the potential of theft or capture is likely.
5 FAH-2 H-736 Radio Accountability
(CT:TEL-107; 01-28-2025)
(State)
a. All radios must have an associated asset record created in the Department's property system of record - the Integrated Logistics Management System (ILMS) Asset Management (AM) module (see 14 FAM 414.1-2). All loaned and/or issued radios must be inventoried during the Department’s annual physical inventory utilizing the ILMS-AM module. Each issue transaction must be documented on a form DS-584 Nonexpendable Property Transaction.
b. Overseas DT staff, and overseas property supervisors and property managers must utilize the ILMS-loanable property (LP) module to loan and/or issue radios to individuals, sections, or agencies (see 14 FAH-1 H-424.3). The ILMS-LP module is configurable to allow overseas LE Staff to have limited access and visibility to asset record information to loan and/or issue radios (5 FAH-2 H-733.5). Personnel should request access via the ILMS user access request form. See the ILMS-LP online tutorials for step-by-step instructions on how to use this module in addition to contacting your A/LM/PMP/PM property management desk officer for assistance.
5 FAH-2 H-737 THROUGH H-739 UNASSIGNED