5 FAH-2 H-730
Overseas Radio Networks
(CT:TEL-101; 07-03-2024)
(Office of Origin: DT/FO/ITI/LWS/RPB)
5 FAH-2 H-731 VHF/UHF/HF Radio networks
(CT:TEL-60; 07-26-2017)
(Uniform all agencies)
Missions use very high frequency (VHF)/ ultrahigh frequency (UHF)/ high frequency (HF) networks for radio communication between mission facilities, residences of mission personnel, official vehicles, and other posts.
5 FAH-2 H-732 Emergency Action Committee (EAC) Networks
(CT:TEL-60; 07-26-2017)
(Uniform all agencies)
a. Emergency Action Committee (EAC) VHF/UHF networks are designed to fulfill the needs of post’s Emergency Action Plan (EAP).
b. The network consists of a repeater and encryption capable base stations, mobile radios in selected official vehicles, and hand-held radios. Base stations and encryption loaders are located in the Information Programs Center (IPC) and post one. Other base stations are located at specified residences and offices, which are designated in the post’s EAP (See 12 FAH-1 Appendix 7).
5 FAH-2 H-732.1 Emergency and Evacuation (E&E) Networks
(CT:TEL-60; 07-26-2017)
(Uniform all agencies)
a. Emergency and Evacuation (E&E) VHF/UHF/HF networks are designed to fulfill the needs of post’s EAP.
b. The network consists of a repeater and digital base stations, mobile radios in selected official vehicles, and hand-held radios. Base stations are located in the Information Programs Center (IPC) and post one. Other base stations are located at specified residences and offices, which are designated in the post’s EAP (See 12 FAH-1 Appendix 7).
5 FAH-2 H-732.2 Administrative Network (ADM)
(CT:TEL-60; 07-26-2017)
(Uniform all agencies)
a. Administrative (ADM) VHF/UHF networks are designed to provide communication to facilitate daily operations such as facility maintenance, General Services Office (GSO), and motor pool.
b. The network typically consists of base stations, mobile radios in official vehicles, hand-held radios, and possibly, a repeater. Base stations are at central locations, such as the motor pool, GSO warehouse, GSO maintenance, and the management section. A base station or other radio unit is often located with the telephone operator for emergencies and monitoring.
5 FAH-2 H-732.3 Local Guard Force (LGF) Networks
(CT:TEL-60; 07-26-2017)
a. Local guard force (LGF) VHF/UHF networks are designed to provide communication between guard posts and mobile patrol vehicles.
b. The network consists of a repeater and base stations, mobile radios in selected official vehicles, and hand-held radios. Base stations are located at guard posts and specified residences and facilities offices, which are designated by the regional security officer.
5 FAH-2 H-732.4 Ambassador Protection Detail (APD) Networks
(CT:TEL-60; 07-26-2017)
a. Ambassador protection detail (APD) VHF/UHF networks are designed to provide communication for movements and protection of the ambassador or chargé d'affaires.
b. The network consists of a repeater and encryption capable mobile radios in selected official vehicles, and hand-held radios.
5 FAH-2 H-732.5 Marine Security Guard (MSG) Networks
(CT:TEL-60; 07-26-2017)
a. Marine security guard (MSG) VHF/UHF/HF networks are designed to provide communication among the MSGs as they perform their security patrols and quick reaction defensive maneuvers.
b. The network consists of a repeater and encryption capable digital base stations, mobile radios in selected official vehicles, and hand-held radios. The base station is typically located in the marine security guard quarters.
5 FAH-2 H-732.6 Worldwide Protective Services (WPS) Networks
(CT:TEL-60; 07-26-2017)
At certain high-threat posts, DS deploys protective details for COM personnel under its WPS contract. Subscriber equipment may be contractor furnished equipment (CFE), and repeaters and associated networks may be government furnished equipment (GFE).
5 FAH-2 H-732.7 Operational Testing
(CT:TEL-60; 07-26-2017)
(Uniform all agencies)
a. E&E/EAC radio systems must be tested monthly, or more frequently, as directed by the Chief of Mission to ensure the operational readiness of equipment and the proficiency of system users. Anyone who might use the networks in an emergency, including spouses and children, should participate in these tests. The information management officer (IMO), in coordination with the post’s executive office, shall establish firm commitments from all users to ensure active participation in the testing upon issuance of the hand-held radio.
b. Post’s EAC must establish procedures for the monthly radio tests on the EAC and E&E networks. The test results must be made available to the management officer (MO), deputy chief of mission (DCM), regional security officer (RSO), and information programs officer (IPO). If needed, the Regional Information Management Center (RIMC) may be included.
c. Administrative networks should be tested monthly. The IMO should coordinate with the management section to conduct radio tests. Test results should be forwarded to the IMO, MO, and if needed the RIMC.
5 FAH-2 H-732.8 Radio User Training
(CT:TEL-60; 07-26-2017)
(Uniform all agencies)
Information management personnel at post will provide familiarization training to all participants on how to use the E&E, EAC, and ADM radio equipment assigned to them. The LGF familiarization training for hand-held radios, base stations, and mobile patrol radios is the responsibility of the RSO/PSO. DT personnel may assist the RSO/PSO with guidance and training on these types of equipment.
5 FAH-2 H-733 Radio Encryption
(CT:TEL-101; 07-03-2024)
(State)
DT’s Radio Programs Branch (DT/FO/ITI/LWS/RPB) provides Advance Encryption Standard (AES) radios for Emergency Action Committee networks. These encryption algorithms provide limited protection from unauthorized interception of voice communications. AES is approved for transmissions up to and including Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU). Under no circumstances should AES-equipped radios be used for the transmission of classified information, as defined by Executive Order 13526.
5 FAH-2 H-733.1 Controlling and Safeguarding Radios
(CT:TEL-60; 07-26-2017)
(State)
a. The classification of AES radio equipment, whether loaded with active AES key codes or not, is sensitive but unclassified (SBU). Locally Employed Staff (LE Staff), or Third-Country Nationals (TCNs) must not be permanently issued portable (hand-held) radios equipped with AES encryption. Locally Employed Staff (LES), or Third-Country Nationals (TCNs) may be granted limited use of AES-equipped radios, if approved in writing by the mission's IMO. However, foreign national access and use of AES radios must be limited to an immediate operational requirement. When foreign nationals are granted access to AES radio equipment, all cleared AES radio users must be notified that foreign nationals have been granted access to the encrypted system.
b. The installation of the AES radios must be limited to vehicles assigned to the Chief of Mission, Marine security guards, Regional Security Office, and those vehicles specifically identified in the mission’s Emergency Action Plan (EAP) for evacuation use (See 12 FAH-1 Appendix 7).
c. Spare encryption capable radios must be zeroized and stored in secure locations accessible to Information Programs Center (IPC) personnel including the local radio/telephone technician. If not equipped with a zeroize feature, a randomly produced key code must be loaded in order to overwrite the mission's actual operational code prior to storage by local staff. To ensure the integrity of encrypted conversations, all personnel issued an encryption capable radio must maintain proper accountability at all times. In the event a radio cannot be accounted for, the IMO and/or IPO must initiate an encryption key change.
d. All radios must have an associated asset record created in the Department's property system of record - the Integrated Logistics Management System (ILMS) Asset Management (AM) module (see 14 FAM 414.1-2). All loaned and/or issued radios must be inventoried during the Department’s annual physical inventory utilizing the ILMS-AM module. Each issue transaction must be documented on a form DS-584 Nonexpendable Property Transaction.
e. Domestic and overseas IMO staff, property supervisors and property managers must utilize the ILMS-loanable property (LP) module to loan and/or issue radios to individuals, sections, or agencies (see 14 FAH-1 H-424.3). The ILMS-LP module is configurable to allow overseas locally employed (LE) staff to have limited access and visibility to asset record information in order to loan and/or issue radios (5 FAH-2 H-733.5). Personnel should request access via the ILMS user access request form. See the ILMS-LP online tutorials for step-by-step instructions on how to use this module in addition to contacting your A/LM/PMP/PM property management desk officer for assistance.
5 FAH-2 H-733.2 Maintenance
(CT:TEL-101; 07-03-2024)
(State)
a. Maintenance of AES-equipped radios must only be performed by information management technical specialist (IMTS), information management specialist (IMS), or contractors that specialize in radio communications.
b. Foreign nationals may install and remove vehicle and fixed AES equipment. These radios must be zeroized or have a randomly produced key code loaded by the IMO and/or IPO prior to foreign nationals’ installation or removal.
c. When maintenance requirements of AES radio equipment exceeds the capabilities of post IMSs, equipment must be shipped via classified pouch to the Regional Information Management Center (RIMC) or DT’s Radio Program Branch for servicing.
d. All AES radio equipment in storage or maintenance must be zeroized of all key codes. If not equipped with a zeroize feature, a randomly produced key code must be loaded in order to overwrite the mission's actual operational code.
5 FAH-2 H-733.3 Key Loaders
(CT:TEL-60; 07-26-2017)
(State)
a. All AES encryption key loaders must be controlled by the information programs officer (IPO) and stored in the mission's Information Programs Center (IPC).
b. AES key loading equipment and key codes for radio systems operating at the SBU level fall under NIST regulations (NIST SP 800-53, SP 800-57, FIPS-197) and are not COMSEC accountable items.
5 FAH-2 H-733.4 Compromise and Loss of AES Equipment
(CT:TEL-60; 07-26-2017)
(State)
The integrity of AES encryption keys and equipment is critical to ensuring that radio communication is protected. Any AES equipped radio, keying equipment, or key codes that are lost, stolen, seized, captured, or otherwise compromised, must be reported immediately to the IMO/IPO and RSO.
5 FAH-2 H-733.5 Emergency Destruction
(CT:TEL-60; 07-26-2017)
(State)
a. The mission's IMO and RSO must determine the appropriate course of action, based on local conditions, to protect the integrity of the Department's AES equipment. For situations that require the abandonment of AES radio assets, actions should be taken to ensure that the AES equipment is destroyed. In a nonemergency situation, the equipment must be sent via classified pouch to the mission’s designated safe haven for secure storage. AES equipment should be included in the “list of holdings section” on the “facility specific information” as part of the “destruction of sensitive materials” response plan in the EAP (See 12 FAH-1 Annex E 4.2).
b. In the event the mission should execute its COMSEC Emergency Destruction Plan (see 5 FAH-6 on ClassNet), all AES radio equipment must be collected, zeroized, and secured in the mission's IPC after its use is no longer practical. AES-equipped radios that must be abandoned with vehicles must be destroyed using an appropriate destruction device (e.g., a sledge hammer) if removal of the equipment is not possible. AES equipment must never be abandoned, keyed and in working condition, if the potential of theft or capture is likely.
5 FAH-2 H-734 THROUGH H-739 UNASSIGNED